Though not lying along the edges of the lithosphere plates where earthquakes are common, India experienced the first major earthquake of the millennium. The severity of the earthquake in Kutch, Gujarat on 26 January 2001 could justly be compared to the Good Friday earthquake on 27 March 1964 near Anchorage, Alaska.

Whatever the statistical or analytical controversy, the bottom line, India’s fastest developing State– – Gujarat, was forced on its knees; reminding one and all the sheer haplessness and hopelessness of mankind against rages of Nature.

From being technically ill equipped to financially constrained, the Government of India was always on the back foot since the first building-dubiously inspected and approved by corrupt government authorities, crashed like ninepins on India’s Republic Day last year in the Kutch region.

Ironically, for once, the political clout got unified in pursuing speedy rehabilitation of the affected in Gujarat. Unfortunately, parallel to that, due to the collapsing infrastructure and frustrating bureaucracy – thanks to our internationally unmatched dirty politics, the toll of multiplying victims due to man-made bungles was equally heart sickening.

The dawdling attitude of the embarrassingly confused parliamentarians at the Center who were largely responsible for delaying crucial relief and rescue the aftermath of the devastating tremors was but predictable. To add insult to injury, unjustified speculations of the number of casualties, irrational hypothesise of more tremors, and quakes by senior politicians certainly were unforgivable. Not only did it cause unnecessary fear in the common man’s mind and heart but friends and relatives from all parts of the nation tried reaching the over crowded quake regions more out of desperation than concern and subsequently hampered relief measures.

The All Parties Meeting convened by the Prime Minister on the eighth day of the disaster to discuss relief operations in the quake ravaged zone, vividly reflected the casual attitude of our political pundits in pursuing issues pertaining to human lives, let alone human rights. Even after three weeks, villages in interior Kutch had not received adequate relief. Trucks carrying relief material drove on to over supplied quake-affected towns and cities as isolated villagers looked on haplessly and ultimately had to hijack food loaded trucks in sheer desperation.

Obviously, like it’s parental governing body at the Center, the state government in Gujarat was equally responsible for all the compounded blunders while dealing with the calamity at hand. Distribution of relief material was communalised as were the funds. Politics came into play instead of genuine governance. Bureaucratic discrimination was rampant. It would be justified to assert that, including both the State and the Central governments, the rhetoric Opposition party was also accountable for every needless human life lost in the aftermath of one of the worst human tragedies of Independent India.

However, the only silver lining was that local government authorities had diligently worked beyond limits while dealing with the after effects of the Gujarat catastrophe. Senior officials like Collector of Kutch, Mr. Kamal Dayani and his colleagues were reported to be running the local administrative machinery more with blood and sweat than by usual verbal supervision. Local communities like the Dawoodi Bohra Muslim Community with its regional network of volunteers and administrators were the first to set up food distribution and medical camps for the locals- long before international and governmental organizations steeped in Kutch.

Furthermore, the print and electronic media both made remarkable efforts to particularly convey the grief, pain and tribulations of the quake affected to the masses. Taking into view the antiquated Indian judicial system and political complacency, the Indian press was the only commendable Solicitor which could have ensured justice for the grief stricken people of Gujarat who were, for days left desolated and unattended due to the carelessness and callousness of their elected legislative representatives.

Pathetically, like the political clout, the Fourth Estate didn’t shoulder the tremendous long-term responsibility to consistently report the pall of miseries hovering over Kutch and to make sure the plight of its people was not forgotten. But it stands to reason that, lapse on the Media’s part during the year, eventually opportuned the Distress Management Cell, tentatively set up by Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayjee to be shrewdly shoved into cold storage by the governing guardians of India. As usual the Cell shall only gingerly resurface from its political hibernation after the nation once again experiences the wrath of Nature.

The State of Gujarat since 1998 has experienced two killer cyclones, two devastating floods and followed by the all destructive earthquake in Western India on the dawn of the new millennium. Shall it take a few more devastating natural calamities to awaken the political community to take effective measures for its pained citizens.

In the meantime can the Government of India show any commendable betterment it has done for the people of Gujarat, particularly in the rural areas where even after twelve months; people still languish under plastic sheet roofs? Where have all the billions and billions of funds been channeled to? As usual, no answers!

The heart-rending fact is, even as thousands cry in angst, deprivation and fear amidst the ruins of Kutch, they’re a voice in the wilderness.

AUTHOR: Qureish Raghib
E-MAIL: Qhraghib [at] gmail.com

Visakhapatnam Steel Plant has been conferred Navratna status on 17 ovember 2010. The company focuses on producing value-added steel, with 214,000 tonnes produced in August 2010, out of 252,000 tonnes total of salable steel produced.

In its blast furnace-III that was erected as part of a plan to expand the plant capacity to 6.3 million tones where the explosion took place when the officials were conducting a trial run of the recently commissioned oxygen plant.

This is the second accident at the plant in a span of one month. On May 1, two people had died in a furnace blast. In another fire mishap, on May 22, a conveyor belt carrying raw material to a new blast furnace completely melted, stalling the production and causing property loss of about Rs.1 crore.

The machinery in the newly-built plant where the latest mishap occurred was erected by a German company, that didn’t provide expertise or any proper instructions to the steel plant and is blamed for such industrial mishap.

However, the Employees’ Union blamed negligence on the part of the management for frequent accidents in the plant. Trade union leaders allege that maintenance work in the plant had been neglected for more than a year and there was no supervision of safety or quality in the expansion work.

The recent tragedy was the worst ever accident in a steel plant in India. In it’s recently released green rating of the Indian steel sector, Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) had drawn the attention of Vizag Steel to its poor safety record.

The latest accident at Vizag Steel is symptomatic of the overall safety and health situation in the Indian steel industry, says a CSE official.

In fact, the CSE’s Green Rating Project (GRP) survey has revealed that over 144 people died in the period 2007-2010 in 17 of the 21 steel plants which the survey studied.

Poor occupational safety management system was found as a clear area of concern in all the steel plants of the country.

The CSE-GRP study during the three-year period found that more than 50 people die every year in major steel plants of the country. It also found that the steel industry of India has one of the worst safety performances in the world.

Iron and steel plants involve several complex processes with hazardous working conditions that require skilled understanding of the safety hazards.

The existing safety monitoring and coordinating structures lack expertise or enforcement capacity to regulate safety measures in steel plants.

It was also clearly found that OHSAS 18001 certification does not have any correlation with the safety records of these plants. This is why existing institutional structures have completely failed to reduce accident rates in the sector.

As concluded in the GRP study and given the latest unfortunate incident at Vizag Steel, it is again being recommended that a specialist regulatory body needs to be put in place to supervise, enforce, train, enhance disclosure and improve the overall safety performance of the steel plants in India..

There is also a need for strengthening of the existing laws of the 1948 Factories Act under which steel industry safety is being currently regulated.

The institutional mechanism and laws of the country are severely constrained to manage, supervise safety and health performance of the steel sector.

Before any other inferno grips a steel factory in India, it is high time to have a foolhardy mechanism in place in such factories to avoid such industrial mishaps happening again.

AUTHOR: Mujtaba Syed
URL: http://mujtabas-musings.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: syedalimujtaba [at] yahoo.com

At a forum that brought together climate scientists from the KMD, community representatives and leaders (including traditional forecasters, religious leaders, chiefs, women leaders, youth leaders and pastoralist and farmer group leaders) ; local government officials (including from the Agriculture, Environment, the provincial administration ,Water, Planning and ASALs), civil society organizations at the community and local levels in Thika, James Muhnidi of the KMD said the situation in the three months appears to be closely related to the devastating drought of 2009.

According to Muhindi, although there was good rainfall the last quarter of 2011 with analysis of the “Short Rains” (October-November-December) 2011 seasonal rainfall indicating that the performance was generally good with all the meteorological stations in Wajir, Lodwar and Mandera recording more than 300 percent of their seasonal (above 75% of the Long-Term Mean (LTM)) rainfall, the pastoralists have however not recovered from the 2009 drought and any rainfall shortfall in the following months will seriously affect them.

Recalling what happened then, communities from NEP said they expect deaths due to starvation, migration in search of pasture and water, conflicts among communities in the province and wildlife human conflicts unless remedial measures are taken.

In 2009, livestock were moved to Lamu, Somalia and few animals that left the province returned. The few that returned came back with diseases.

A combination of drought, high food prices, the lingering effects of post-election violence, a cholera outbreak, and a continued influx of refugees from Somalia left hundreds of thousands of people in the province in need of assistance.

Experts attributed the rise in the shortened cycle of natural disasters to global climate change and environmental degradation.

December, January, February and March have so far been dry. Muhindi said January recorded the highest temperatures in 13 years and some parts of NEP have already started some water stress and reduced pasture.

He urged government agencies not to relax based on the last good rain season last October, November and December warning that pastoralists require two good seasons before they can fully recover.

However, this time round, said Muhinid, pastoralists are likely to be hit with another devastating drought before they are fully recovered.

According to predictions from the global circulations from the Pacific and other factors controlling the weather, the factors indicate the 2009 scenario…meaning that rainfall would be very little. Then rainfall was less than 20%.

The rain is expected on the second week of April and may last barely two weeks to end early May.

Maureen Amabni, Climate and Communication officer, CARE International in Kenya’s Adaptation Learning Programme(ALP) the communities will pick the information and take it down to their communities who will in turn decide what to do with the information.

AUTHOR: Henry Neondo
URL: http:// www.africasciencenews.org
E-MAIL: neondohenry [at] yahoo.com

The Defense Minister made the following declaration on national television [li and fr]:

C’est juste un incident provoqué par l’incendie du dépôt de nos munitions. C’est pourquoi il y a eu des détonations. Certaines maisons ont été touchées par des éclats, leurs tôles envolées et des vitres brisées. C’est l’incendie du régiment blindé, lieu où nous conservons nos munitions, qui est à la base de tous ces dégâts. Pendant que je vous parle ici, nos experts se sont déployés sur le terrain pour éteindre le feu. Nous prendrons des mesures pour que les incidents de ce genre ne surviennent plus dans l’avenir. Nous présentons nos excuses aux hommes et aux femmes, à tous les frères et soeurs, pour ce trouble à la paix : des gens étaient paniqués, allant de gauche à droite. Nous vous prions de regagner vos domiciles car l’incident est maîtrisé. Nous vous rassurons qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une mutinerie, encore moins d’un coup d’Etat. Il s’agit juste d’un malheureux incident que nous regrettons. Nous avons appris aussi qu’il y a des blessés – ils ne sont pas nombreux – dus à ces éclats. Nous le regrettons.

It’s just an incident caused by a fire in our ammunition storage depot. That is why there have been explosions. Some homes were damaged by the explosions that caused roofs to fly off and break window panes. It is this fire in the armored regiment, where we keep our ammunition, that caused all this damage. As we speak, our experts are deployed on the ground to extinguish the fire. We will take steps to ensure that such incidents do not occur in the future. We apologize to all men and women, to all brothers and sisters, for this disturbance of the peace: people were running around in a panic. Please return to your homes, because the situation is under control. We assure you that this is not a mutiny, much less a coup. It’s just an unfortunate incident that we regret. We learned also that have been some casualties – though not many – due to these blasts. We are sorry.

The exact number of casualties is unclear at the moment, but according to several sources, hundreds might have lost their lives, and thousands wounded. The government first mentioned four casualties, and dozens wounded, an underestimated toll, according to Fortuné Ndombé, a Congolese journalist based in Brazzaville. The author contacted Ndombé by phone and he explained the situation at the time [fr]:

Je suis actuellement au CHU de Brazzaville. C’est une catastrophe on n’a jamais vu ça. Il y a encore des feux, beaucoup de maisons sont effondrées, c’est un vrai désastre. on n’arrive pas à expliquer ce qui s’est passé. (…) La situation pas encore maitrisée. Le gouvernment laissait croire qu’il n y a pas de morts, mais il ya plusieurs morts. Les hopitaux submergés. Je déplore que presque toutes les pharmacies soient fermées. Il faudrait les réquisitionner pour que les malades recoivent des médicaments. C’est peut-être demain que nous en saurons un peu plus. Si quelqu’un vous dit que la situation est maitrisée, ce sont des mensonges.

I am currently at the University Hospital of Brazzaville. This is a disaster of proportions unlike anything we have ever seen. There are still fires, many houses collapsed, it’s a real disaster. We cannot explain what happened. (…) The situation is still not under control. The government gave the impression that there are no deaths, but there are several fatalities. Hospitals are overwhelmed. I regret that almost all pharmacies are closed. They should be requisitioned so that patients receive medications. It’s probably only tomorrow that we’ll know a little more. If someone tells you that the situation is under control, that is a lie.

This assessment of the situation is shared by Twitter user @BaaRbieCaRteR, who writes:

@BaaRbieCaRteR:  4 morts 24 blessés !! Vous vous foutez de la gueule de qui ????! Ya plus de 300 morts ! On se croirait en Irak

4 killed 24 wounded! Who the hell are you kidding??! There are more than 300 dead! It’s like Iraq around here. She also posted the following photo, allegedly taken just after the second blast.

 
First published on Global Voices.

AUTHOR: Julie Owono
URL: http://bantupolitics.blogspot.com/

One day after the March 4, 2012, blasts in the ammunition depot in Mpila, near Brazzaville, the time has come to assess the number of victims. Recent assessments vary from 150 to 200 deaths and 1,500 injured as a result of the blasts. The daze and confusion from the explosions have now given way to anger and a sense of solidarity.

On Digital Congo, a review of the press coverage of the blasts quotes the daily newspaper Le Phare, which offers a detailed account of the disaster [fr]:

D’après les responsables congolais, les explosions ont été provoquées par un incendie dans le dépôt de munitions de la caserne du régiment blindé du quartier Mpila situé au bord du fleuve Congo. Des habitants sont encore prisonniers dans leurs maisons. Ils disent que tout le quartier Mpila a été détruit, a précisé Betu Bangana [Chef du protocole de la présidence congolaise]. Il y aurait plusieurs centaines de blessés

According to Congolese officials, the explosions were caused by a fire in the ammunition depot of the barracks of the armored regiment of Mpila neighborhood, located on the banks of the river Congo. Some residents are still trapped in their homes. They say that the whole Mpila neighborhood was destroyed, adds Betu Bangana [The Congolese president’s Chief of Protocol]. Several hundred people were likely injured by the blasts.

A video posted on Youtube by Lebeization depicts the great impact of one of the explosions:

The following photo, shared on Congo Futur Espoir‘s album on Facebook shows the type of ammunition that was stored in Mpila:

A photo of the alleged type of munitions stored in Mpila depot - From Congo Espoir Futur 's Facebook page

The fact that such weaponry was kept in the center of the city has been the cause of the population’s anger.

Ghislain Nardello asks in the Facebook comments [fr]:

Pourquoi l’armement de notre force armée peut etre gardée au coeur de la Capitale (Brazaville)? Car ceci allait etre utilisé que pour la defense de notre nation contre les autres, mais aujourdh’hui cela a servi a la bataille contre nos propre frères et soeurs congolais, et aussi à la destruction des biens de l’État et des civils. Le gouvernement doit prendre en charge les morts et blessés et dédommager les familles et recontruire leurs biens.

How could the weaponry of our armed forces be kept in the heart of the capital (Brazzaville)? It was meant to defend our nation against our enemies but today it has only caused casualties among our Congolese brothers and sisters and also the destruction of public and civil property. The government must take care of the dead and the wounded, compensate families and rebuild their homes.

Chancel Moussavou continues [fr]:

voila ce qui arrive quand on ne ne pense qu’aux armes! Tout cet argent dépensé pour l’achat de ces armes aurait servit a la construction d une ecole, d’un hosto ou bien d’une quelquonque entreprise! Comment les gens pouront ils se sentir en securité apres ce genre d accident! Franchement c’est pathétique!

This is what happens when all one thinks about is weapons. All this money spent to buy arms could have been used to build schools, hospitals or to support companies. How can the people feel safe after such accident. Honestly, this is pathetic!

Hospitals are currently overwhelmed as shown in this video taken from the Congolese National Television and shared by Patrick Eric Mampouya:

Congolese are starting to organize rescue and relief missions for the affected families and friends. The Paris-based NGO Synergies and Development of Africa has launched a call [fr] to the diaspora:

dans l’urgence, nous voulons renforcer les équipes sur le terrain ; apporter du matériel d’urgence médicale ou de première nécessité. Cela va des petits accessoires, des trousses de secours, des pansements, antiseptiques, petite chirurgie, compresses, médicaments, …

Given the urgency of the situation, we want to boost the rescue teams on the ground; bring emergency and first aid supplies. These range from first aid kits, bandages, antiseptic solutions, minor surgery tools, compress, drugs, …

Congolese citizens are also mobilizing aid efforts through Facebook pages dedicated to Brazzaville.

First published on Global Voices.

AUTHOR: Julie Owono
URL: http://bantupolitics.blogspot.com/

Market in Douala

The disclosure was made by the Civil Protection Commission after an evaluation tour to markets yesterday. Any talk about markets in metropolitan Douala quickly recalls disasters whose colossal losses have clung to memories over the years. As a consequence of fire outbursts commonly imputed to faulty electrical connections, little or nothing was known that lighted cigarette tubs, explosion of gas lighters, electrified pressing iron and other equipment forgotten unto the next day could plunge the entire market into a razing fire. Business persons in Nkolouloun disclose such important causes in a recent vox pop with Cameroon Tribune.

As Christmas approached, the economic capital was not without reports such like “fire outbreak again in Marché…” Such catastrophes in the years gone by did not only lead to insurmountable economic consequences that compelled some traders to pack for their villages, but also slackened national economic growth and hastened drop in the living standard of individual households. A reasonably counter measure has been government’s creation of Department of Civil Protection in MINATD charged with sensitization and prevention of catastrophes. Civil Protection Director, Dr. Jean-Pierre Nana, convened stakeholders for a visit to markets in Mboppi, Congo, Sandaga and the Central Market and held a restitution workshop in continuation of discussions held in Limbe, South West, in February 2011 to curb catastrophes in markets. The delegation consisting of commission members, Divisional Officers, mayors and fire fighters noted some 100 fire incidents between January and December 2011, evaluated how effective the measures to curb disaster in markets decided upon in Limbe were being implemented in urban Douala.

Of the causes that predispose Douala’s markets to catastrophes, insufficient equipments, vigilance and security, inability of existing security and vigilante, faulty electrical connections. Fire Fighting Brigade raised setbacks like inadequate equipment, for instance the need for a helicopter to evade delays caused by traffic jam, among others. Alice Maguedjo, traders’ union president, warned that fire incidents in Mboppi are due to vengeance by some traders expelled from the market after the Urban Council sold the same place to more than two persons. “Authorities should stop selling places when markets are already full and there no spaces left,” she said. Oscar Kong, trade union president of Sandaga, was concerned about the anarchy that reigns in the market: “it has forestalled 60-65 per cent of traders from paying their dues. A catastrophe is looming,” he warned. It was resolved that markets will recruit a special force known as “Market Police” to maintain law and order, while the general public is called upon to use ICE (In Case of Emergency) as name registered to a phone number to be used in any form of catastrophe.

AUTHOR: Shout Africa
URL: http://www.shout-africa.com
E-MAIL: news [at] shout-africa.com

It was carrying 81 people: nine crew members, 60 troops and 12 civilians. Forty-two bodies have been found, three other people were severely wounded in the crash. The search continues for the others.

A local resident told Reuters news agency there was thick fog at the time of the crash. The mineral-rich, mainly desert territory of Western Sahara is the subject of a decades-long dispute between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front. The crash is believed to be one of Morocco’s deadliest air disasters in years.

AUTHOR: Nangayi Guyson
URL: http://lifeyouthministry.yolasite.com
E-MAIL: n.guyson [at] yahoo.com

Eleven years ago, experts warned that by 2015, it would take 19 hours to evacuate the increasingly populated 16-km-emergency evacuation zone around Koeberg nuclear power plant, according document:
EMERGENCY EVACUATION MODELLING FOR THE KOEBERG NUCLEAR POWER STATION.

Koeberg, Africa’s only nuclear power station, is sited along the Atlantic Ocean, 12km from the edge of the Cape Town metropole and 30km from parliament and its bustling harbour. Yet despite international requirements that populations close to nuclear plants should be kept to a minimum, Cape Town’s metropole has been allowed to spread ever-northwards – in fact two towns, Atlantis and Melkbosstrand, are nestled right next to Koeberg’s outer fences. Experts already warned in 2000 that within fifteen years, it would take up to 19 hours to evacuate the population in a 16km radius of the plant in case of a nuclear emergency.

Earthquake warnings
Koeberg is located right next to the Atlantic Ocean near the Augrabies earthquake zone. Top scientist Dr Chris Hartnady of the Umvoto Africa CSIR satellite centre warned on 11 April 2010 that both Durban and Cape Town could soon be hit by an earthquake: measurements show that the region’s tectonic plates are increasingly active along the entire East African rift faultline and this could pose a major threat to South Africa. And with increasing activity logged over the entire past year at Augrabies in the Northern Cape, these could be early-warning signs for a large earthquake. (http://censorbugbear-reports.blogspot.com/2010/04/earthquake-warning-for-south-africa.html)
Yet despite the obvious need for a clear, precise and well-trained evacuation plan for its millions of residents, Cape Town does not have one. Emergency-evacuation exercises have never been held with the population.

A year 2000 computer-generated traffic evacuation simulation for Koeberg estimated that the population located inside the 16km radius around Koeberg that year could have been evacuated within 4.5 hours – but that by the year 2015 due to the rapid population growth towards Koeberg, “traffic demand will clear in a period of about 19 hours…’ Since 1948, South Africa has been Africa’s only nuclear-power. The country supplied the uranium for the world’s first atom-bombs developed in the USA. And Koeberg ‘s two seawater-cooled French-built reactors were completed in 1984 despite the fact that it was hit by a devastating bomb two years earlier. (history)

Draft emergency-evacuation regulations drawn up for Koeberg in Oct 2010 – but its Public Safety Information Meetings are held at Pelindaba, Pretoria:

By October 2010, NECSA, (the State-owned ‘Nuclear Energy Corporation of SA’) official Ditebogo Kgomo Ditebogo.Kgomo@energy.gov.za was still advertising “for the public to comment on proposed draft regulations on the development of the formal emergency planning zone of the Koeberg Nuclear power plant’. Its website carried a minute amount of information on what the public should do in an emergency situation around Koeberg. They did mention that an ‘Public Safety Information Meeting’ would be held on 26 March 2011 at Gate 1, Pelindabathe Necsa Visitor Centre, at 09:00 AM, which is located at Church Street West Extension, Brits District in Pelindaba, North West Province 0240;

Necsa website: “What to do in case of an Emergency “
• Stay calm
• Go indoors (staying indoors provides significant protection)
• Close all doors and windows
• Switch off air conditioners
• Tune into Radio Jacaranda (94.2FM) or Motsweding (89.6-91FM) for instructions
• Periodic announcements shall be made concerning the emergency status and actions that must be taken. If it is necessary to evacuate a specific area, an announcement stating the safest route shall be made
• Only use the telephone if it is absolutely necessary since it may be necessary to contact you by telephone
• BE A GOOD neighbour. If you see anyone outdoors please advise him/her to take shelter
• Help the deaf and disabled
• If you are travelling by car at the time of the emergency close all your windows and air vents and leave the affected area. In case Necsa’s Telkom land lines are not working, please dial: 083 639 0366 / 082 806 3611 Please see this document below for instructions in other languages.

2000 report: “EMERGENCY EVACUATION MODELLING FOR THE KOEBERG NUCLEAR POWER STATION”
Kostas Rontiris, Director, Independent Consulting Engineering (Pty) Ltd, S Africa
W Crous, Head of Transport Planning Department, Cape Metropolitan Council, S Africa

1. INTRODUCTION
The Koeberg nuclear power station is situated about 26km north of the Cape Town central business district. Development in the metropolitan area has spread northwards since the power station was constructed. The present population living in the area around the power station, as well as high expected future growth,have given rise to concerns relating to the evacuation times of the area in the event of a nuclear emergency.

This paper presents the evaluation results of the existing evacuation plan in terms of transportation impacts, highlights the use of EMME/2, and lists the recommendations made to the National Nuclear Regulatory Board.

2. BACKGROUND
Nuclear facilities are obliged to put evaluation plans in place and to ensure that they are operational. There are a number of physical elements in a nuclear evacuation that need to be complied with, in order to reduce exposure to radiation. These range from notification of an emergency to sheltering, administration of stable iodine, evacuation of the population, the caring and repatriation of evacuees, amongst others. Legally, the nuclear operating authority must provide detailed safety and emergency procedures able to cope with emergencies. Such procedures have been developed in line with South African and international standards. These have well defined spatial elements but there are no strong time elements relating to the evacuation of affected areas. In terms of the South African Nuclear Regulator Act of 1999. there are no specific requirements with regard to maximum evacuation times of affected areas in the event of an emergency.

3. APPROPRIATE TOOL
The accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station in 1979 resulted in the adoption of emergency evacuation planning based on traffic simulation software packages. This dynamic simulation approach produces turning movements on each link which are then introduced to the simulation data set to model delays and congestion. The resultant evacuation time estimates are obtained when the network is cleared. In terms of this investigation, which focuses on the broad transport evacuation issues and also the expected future performance of the transport system in the event of an emergency, it was decided to use the existing EMME/2 model calibrated for the Cape Metropolitan area. EMME/2 does not give the same level of detail as a simulation model but in this study it did assist the process by quickly defining the traffic demand flows for a number of scenarios that needed to be tested.

4. ZONING SYSTEM
International practice is to subdivide the area around a nuclear facility into a number of zones as follows :
• the Public Exclusion Boundary (PEB) : an area of approximately 2km radius from the nuclear facility which is not accessible to the public;
• the Inner Emergency Protection Zone (Inner EPZ) is an area radiating 5km from the reactor more: http://www.inro.ca/en/pres_pap/asian/asi00/EMME2Asian.pdf

Koeberg: history of terrorism; poor maintenance; 91 staffers contaminated with Cobalt-58
Terrorism:
On 8 January 1982, Umkhonto we Sizwe, (MK) the armed wing of the (now ruling) African National Congress (US-listed-terrorist) organisation, attacked Koeberg nuclear power plant while under construction. Damage was estimated at R 500m. Its commissioning was put back by 18 months. In 2010, the bomber was identified as being Rodney Wilkinson. (source: Beresford, David (2010). Truth is a Strange Fruit: A Personal Journey Through the Apartheid War. Jacana. ISBN 9781770099029 and “History of MK“. African National Congress. Archived from the original on 2007-04-04. Retrieved 2007-05-14).

In August 2002 twelve Greenpeace activists obtained access to the station. Six scaled the wall of the plant to hang up an anti-nuclear protest banner. The twelve were arrested and fined. (source: Jo-Anne Smetherham (2002-08-25). “Greenpeace in the dock over Koeberg raid“. Cape Times. Retrieved 2007-05-1

91 staffers contaminated by Cobalt-58 on 12 Sept 2010:
On 12 September 2010, 91 members of staff were contaminated with Cobalt-58 residue in a mysterious incident that a’appeared to be confined to the plant”. (source SAPA (2010-09-20). “Koeberg workers contaminated“. News24. Retrieved 2010-09-22).

Technical difficulties
At the end of 2005, Koeberg started experiencing numerous technical difficulties. On 11 November 2005, a fault on a transmission busbar caused the reactor to go into safe mode, cutting supply to most of the Western Cape for about two hours. On 16 November a fire under a 400kV transmission line caused the line to trip, causing severe voltage dips which resulted in Koeberg once again shutting down. Various parts of the Cape were left without electricity for hours at a time. On the evening of 23 November 2005, a routine inspection of the backup safety system revealed a below-spec concentration of an important chemical, resulting in a controlled shutdown of the reactor. Major power cuts were not experienced until Friday 25 November, when the backup capacity began running out. At this point, rotational load shedding was employed, with customers being switched off in stages for most of the day. Koeberg was re-synchronised to the national grid on Saturday 26 November.

On Sunday 25 December 2005, the generator of Unit 1 was damaged by a worker dropping a spanner into it. While the generator was being powered up after scheduled refuelling and maintenance, a loose bolt, which was left inside the generator caused more severe damage, forcing it to be shut down. Subsequent to the unexpected unavailability of Unit 1, Unit 2 was also brought down for scheduled refuelling, resulting in a severe shortage of supply to the Western Cape. This resulted in widespread load shedding in order to maintain the stability of the network. A replacement rotor for Unit 1 was shipped in from France and the unit was brought back into operation in May 2006.

On 18 and 19 February 2006 large parts of the Western Cape again experienced blackouts due to a “ccontrolled shutdown” of Koeberg. According to Eskom and the City of Cape Town, power cuts were to continue until 26 February 2006, however power supply problems continued beyond this date. The estimated economic losses due to the power cuts was over R 500 M as at February 2007, and was estimated to rise to possibly as high as R 2 billion. http://www.nucleartourist.com/world/koeberg.htm

Background on Rodney Wilkinson,
the British hippy who bombed Koeberg nuclear power station: according to the Sunday Times:

He was South Africa’s one-time national fencing champion – who dropped out of university and joined a commune near Koeberg in the late ’70s. In other words, he was a hippy.The operation was born of chance. When the community ran out of money, Rodney Wilkinson, who had studied building science and politics, reluctantly took a job at the plant then under construction. He worked there for 18 months.

Encouraged by his girlfriend, Heather Gray, a speech therapist, he stole a set of the building plans. The couple took them to newly independent Zimbabwe with the idea that they could be used by the ANC to attack the French-built nuclear installation. It was suspected at the time that the plant would be used by the nationalist government to produce plutonium for the construction of atomic bombs. The ANC, which had recently had one of its agents jailed on charges of nuclear espionage, was initially suspicious of the white South African who pitched up on its doorstep, claiming to have penetrated what was assumed to be the most secure installation in the country.

After lengthy delays, during which the stolen plans were authenticated by Soviet and Western nuclear scientists, and Wilkinson was vetted, the ANC invited him to carry out the attack himself. He was taken aback by the request, but agreed and returned to South Africa. To his surprise, he gained fresh employment at Koeberg, with the task of mapping pipes and valves at the installation for use in case of emergency. The ANC appointed a guerrilla commander in Swaziland to act as Wilkinson’s handler. Once a month he visited the mountain kingdom – a favourite resort for whites in search of illicit pleasures not available in puritanical South Africa – under the pretence of enjoying a “dirty weekend”. There he and his handler thrashed out strategy, designed to maximise embarrassment to the South African authorities while ensuring the minimum risk to human life. They honed down possible targets to the two reactor heads, another section of the containment building, and a concentration of electric cables under the main control room.

16 December target date:
The choice of the reactor heads, which would be used to control the nuclear reaction, was to maximise the propaganda impact. Made of 110 tons of steel, they were unlikely to be seriously affected by the blasts, but they would demonstrate the ANC’s capacity to hit at the heart of the plant. The other two targets were chosen to cause as much damage as possible. Wilkinson established that nuclear fuel had been moved into the plant, ready for loading into the reactors, but it was in dormant storage which minimised any risk of radioactive fallout. The date for the attack was set for December 16. White South Africans marked the day each year with a public holiday celebrating the battle of Blood River, a 19th-century victory by the Boers over the Zulus.

But the date had another significance: the ANC commemorated it as MK Day, in honour of the founding of its guerrilla army, Umkhonto weSizwe. Wilkinson and Gray dug up four limpet mines from a roadside arms cache in the Karoo. Placing them in wine-box decanters in their car, a Renault 5, they drove back to their home in the Cape Town suburb of Claremont, where they hid the devices in holes conveniently dug by their puppy, Gaby. From there Wilkinson smuggled the mines, one by one, in a hidden compartment of the Renault, through the perimeter security fence at the nuclear installation, depositing them in a desk drawer in his prefabricated office. He then carried them, hidden in his overalls, through a security gate into the main building.The build-up to the attack was marked by a series of near mishaps. At one stage an accidental short circuit started a cable fire. The incident was reported in the press and the ANC’s president in exile, Oliver Tambo – who was privy to the planned operation but not to details such as timing – released a statement claiming it as an ANC attack.

The claim prompted a security scare that ended, amid much derision towards the ANC, when the true cause of the blaze was confirmed by investigators. In November the firm hiring Wilkinson told him it was laying him off at the end of the month, but later asked him to stay for another month. He turned this to his advantage, telling the company that in the interim he had taken another job and would have to leave on 17 December, obtaining cover for his planned disappearance.

As it transpired, Wilkinson did not make the target date of December 16, but finished planting the bombs the following day, a Friday. Setting the fuses to a 24-hour delay so that they would explode on the Saturday, when he knew the target areas would be deserted, he was then forced to undergo a farewell party on the premises with his fellow engineers, mentally praying that the time-delayed fuses were not defective.

That afternoon he flew to Johannesburg and was taken, with a borrowed bicycle, to a point near the Swaziland border, where he rode into exile.

The bombs detonated, but not quite as planned: the springs on the firing mechanism proved brittle and the devices exploded over a period of several hours instead of simultaneously. But the damage was devastating. The authorities put the cost at R500-million and the commissioning of the plant was delayed for 18 months. The attack was a chilling demonstration of the vulnerability of an atomic installation to sabotage, as well as a reflection on the incompetence of South African security. The authorities at Koeberg have since made the extraordinary claim that they not only anticipated the attack but had pinpointed the date. In a book on the history of the plant, a former executive, Paul Semark, is quoted as saying: “We knew the ANC would not target Koeberg once nuclear fuel was there, and that they would try to attack at a time which would ensure the least loss of life. We even pinpointed 16 December 1982, which was a public holiday, as the likely date.” Their inability to counter the threat is not explained, however. The apparent helplessness of the authorities is even more astonishing in the light of Wilkinson’s background. Twice he joined the workforce at the plant – on both occasions he was granted access to the most sensitive sectors of nuclear installation – but was never subjected to security vetting. Had they checked his background they could have discovered that he was a military deserter and was involved in the anti-nuclear campaign. Six years earlier, while doing his national service, Wilkinson had been admitted to hospital after wrecking an armoured truck while going Awol with 12 colleagues during the South African invasion of Angola. Military police took statements but, apparently because of the illegality of the Angolan invasion, did not prosecute him.

He was also caught breaching security at the nuclear plant, but nothing was done about it. Alcohol was banned in the plant. Testing security by smuggling in a bottle of vodka – roughly the shape of a limpet mine – he was caught in possession of it while wandering, hiccuping, around the main control room. “I wanted to have a look; you see it in all the films – this great big room with all these banks of computers. But the tension must have been too much for me; I drank the vodka,” he recounts wryly. Detained in the guardroom, he was released after being given a warning by a security officer whom he knew from the local squash club.

Wilkinson says his worst moment was when he was on his way to plant the second mine in the Reactor One containment building and spotted a guard watching him with apparent suspicion.”My legs were like jelly and I could feel beads of perspiration on my face.” He detoured and placed the device at an alternative target the ANC had identified – in another concentration of cables under the second control room.A seemingly impossible obstacle he had to overcome was carrying mines into the “clean” area surrounding the reactors, access to which was gained through an airlock where he had to strip and don protective clothing. But he discovered that pipes leading into the clean area had plastic diaphragms to keep the air clean, and he was able to simply push the bombs through them, pass through the airlock himself, and collect them on the other side.”When I thought of that I was on cloud nine. I had been having sleepless nights about it,” Wilkinson recalls.

A pivotal figure in the operation was Mac Maharaj, an underground leader of the ANC in South Africa and subsequently minister of transport, after whom the project, Operation Mac, was named.”They never got to know how it was done; until now they have not known the identity of this couple,” Maharaj said.South African security forces were expected to retaliate after the blasts and Wilkinson and Gray were placed under deep cover. A couple was later badly injured in an attack, which is believed to have been a misdirected act. Wilkinson flew from Swaziland to Maputo, where he met Tambo in the ANC leader’s office, the two men crying in each other’s arms at their triumph. Gray, who had flown out of South Africa a week before the attack, joined Wilkinson there and they flew to Britain, where they were married in Woodbridge, Suffolk. http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/article626909.ece/The-swordsman-and-the-bomb   

AUTHOR: Adriana Stuijt
URL: http://censorbugbear.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: a.j.stuijt [at] knid.nl