According to Gerbert van der Aa, journalist and historian, only 33% of the Dutch development aid is successful, another 33% fails and of the remaining 33% the effect is unclear.

It is hard to tell whether Dutch aid is effective or not. There are opponents and proponents. You figure it out! But who is right? This uncertainty is the root of the problem, because it creates no support among the Dutch people.

The Netherlands has spent € 100 billion on aid in the last 50 years, apart from private donations. This is 100% tax money. The money is decentralized through all kinds of foundations, like Oxfam Novib, Hivos, Icco and Cordaid. In the Netherlands, the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to foundations. This results to secret writings, because the tax payer cannot read or demand reports about output. Everything happens behind drawn curtains. Foundations are not very critical and only produce flyer talk. Critical passages are embedded in the transshipment of good news show. There is no transparently of the reality. Audits are focused on financial statements. It is a play of accounting figures. There is no audit on track record, output, outcome or whatsoever within vertical relations (between the Dutch government and foundations on one hand and between foundations and NGOs in the South on the other hand). Even the Dutch Inspectorate for development cooperation (Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie - IOB) is not authorized to examine where our tax money is used for. There is only an accounting relationship. And even this bookkeeping (=our tax money) is not made public for the audience. We can only download overall figures.

Dutch foundations found a weapon for defense: a national mark like CBF (Central Bureau on Fundraising). The CBF is controlled by the Accreditation Council (Raad van Accreditatie, RVA) to authorize certification bodies to certify. The RVA is not a typical development organizations, but a general organisation to monitor management systems, persons or product. They do not check tax money vs the effectiveness or efficiency of aid.

Cordaid has received an ISO certification of TNO Quality. It took some effort to find this out. TNO Quality reports that they have no specific label for charities but they have a general quality standard for procedures, processes and continuous improvements. The reports are not public (of course). In short, TNO Quality has no direct relationship with aid or output. Personally I find this very remarkable. Cordaid receives an annual € 160 million to spend on subsidies. They have enough money for their administration. Why test it? To my view, if you can proof your output, the dignity of your whole organisation like the administration and management, is proven. It is the same as the abolition of school exams to evaluate the effectiveness of a school. According to Cordaid and TNO Quality one should just check out the management system of a school.

In short, this all is all very vague. My final conclusion is therefore: development organisations cannot prove their effectiveness in output for decades. On behalf of the Dutch people, the Dutch government spend € 281, – (annually) on development aid for each citizen. For a family with two children (=four people), this means € 1,125.00 per year. In 10 years this means € 14,000.00 (*). Each family will pay € 56,000.00 (*) in 25 years. Some form of justification about what happened with the tax money seems in place.
(*) = including 4% interests

Bill Gates has asked the Dutch government not to cut foreign aid as part of its current discussions on how to comply with European rules limiting deficit spending (see business News). He even invited right-wing political leader Geert Wilders to accompany him to Africa to see development aid at work (see Irish Times). Of course, if famous people get a tour they will experience beautiful things and perfect aid in balance with all stakeholders. But when a ordinary citizen is asking questions, he gets nothing. I would like to suggest Gates to pick up the phone, call USAID, introduce himself as John Smith and start asking questions about solid scientific proof concerning output. Perhaps he can also ask if USAID is willing to share audit details and accounting statements to John Smith. He may call me afterwards to share his experiences…..

Foundations have been negligent and they should look in the mirrow. They had the best cards in hand but they have ruined it themselves. With € 100 billion, Dutch foundations have not been able to create support from public opinion.

In Sweden, the Freedom of Information Act applies to all foundations. They are accountable to every citizen with questions. This is and always has been the missing link within the Dutch development sector. NL-Aid has always advocated for this idea. Until changes, I see € 1 billion in cuts only as a beginning. I am in favor of foreign aid but not if it goes along with secret writings to keep citizens in the dark.

To Mr. gates: What is quantity without quality? More of the same is not sufficient if it is not good from the start. You ask for quantity of the Dutch government, but we should start by changing the culture of aid. Only then quantity has a proper basis.

AUTHOR: Hans Sluijter
URL: www.NL-Aid.org
E-MAIL: info [at] www.NL-Aid.org

US Joint Special Operations Task Force - Trans-Sahara

The Netherlands does not only send police trainers to Afghanistan, but also military trainers to Africa, defence periodical Jane’s Defence Weekly reports. The mission covers a territory larger than Western Europe. It is part of an exercise operation that takes place in Algeria, Chad and Senegal, to name a few. The training will focus on fighting illegal arms trade, smuggling and human trafficking, according to Jane’s. So many positive goals in one sentence calls for some skepticism. Especially when we realize what kind of troops involved.

The exercise is named Flintlock. Flintlock is also the term for an igniter for small arms. Not really a name for an operation tackling illegal arms trade. And so that’s not really what it is. Flintlock is a permanent activity in the framework of the American war against the terrorism (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF). It is organized around the Special Forces, the US troops best equipped and trained for heavy fighting in small and independent groups and for almost surgical individual operations for collecting information, or killing individuals.

Flintlock is an exercise operation established and coordinated through the US Joint Special Operations Task Force – Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS). It is not solely focused on training, but it is a multinational military activity of which training allies is an aspect. Already in 2005, 700 American Special Forces trained 2,100 badly armed soldiers from North and West-African countries, under the name Flintlock. The Netherlands is involved since that time.

Connected to Flintlock, a permanent Multinational Co-ordination Center (MCC) created to streamline the counter-terrorism activities in Mali, Mauritania, Senegal and Chad. When asked, the Dutch ministry of Defence affirmed a few dozen Dutch marines and commando troopers are in Senegal, Chad and Burkina Faso from mid January until half March 2011. They will practice Special Forces operations with forces from those three countries and a number of other European and African countries. Which other countries will participate the ministry of Defence does not want to tell: “Not all countries want to make that public.”

Last year the Dutch weekly military paper, the Defensiekrant, interviewed four Dutch soldiers that took part in Flintlock: Emiel of the army, Rob of the marines and the commandos Eric and Tom. They all said they were eager to return. Rob on Senegal: “You can hike sixty kilometers from the coast into the country, straight through the mangroves. Fantastic!” The largest mangrove area of Senegal lies in the Casamance. In this southern part of Senegal a small armed independency movement is active. In December last year seven Senegalese soldiers died during a clash, Radio France Internationale reported.. The training provided will thus be welcomed by the Senegalese. For arms trade EU criteria exist to measure the effect of trade on human rights, security and development. How about comparable rules for providing training in regions of tension or with high risk of human rights violations? A question which should be asked in parliament.

A high ranked Dutch military, Major General Tom Middendorp, last year watched the operations and came also back enthusiastically. “The particulars of this formula is that you not only train African troops, but also conduct cross training with the participating countries under heavy circumstances. Many goals in one go. Formerly we sent observers only, now we joined with some troops. To me this seems something to repeat,” the Defensiekrant quoted the general. Half a year later this is exactly what happens.

For the United States Flintlock is an operation in the framework of the fight against terrorism. US officer John Williamson, responsible for organizing Flintlock, is glad with the Dutch contribution. He says in a press explanation of JSOTF: “(…) the increased participation of our European SOF partners such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain in tactical training and MCC activities, underscores the importance of our desire for an international approach toward trans-border terrorist threats.”

The Netherlands is regarding Flintlock as an exercise during which Special Forces train others and themselves, according to the Dutch ministry of Defence. It is not seen as an operation. This is despite the fact the US regards it as such and although there is a permanent command structure. But the semantics around the participation clearly shows the Netherlands are involved in the War on Terror or Operation Enduring Freedom on more than one front. Not only in Afghanistan, as is easily forgotten because of all attention for the new deployment in Kunduz.

Sources:
* Zapatero ofrece a EE UU aumentar su presencia militar en España [Zapatero offered to increase U.S. military presence in Spain], Ignacio Cembrero, El Pais, Madrid December 7, 2010.
* Training in Trans-Sahara Africa, Max R. Blumenfeld, JSOTF-TS Public Affairs, GAO, Mali, December 13, 2010.
* Flintlock 2010 traint Afrikaanse troepen in Special Forces-operaties [Flintlock 2010 trains African troops for Special Forces operations], Defensiekrant no. 26, July 8, 2010.
* Spain joins anti-insurgency exercises, Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 2nd, 2011.

AUTHOR: Martin Broek
URL: http://broekstukken.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: m.broek@xs4all.nl

EDITOR: Frank van Schaik

The authoritarian regime of Mubarak was armed mainly by the US. But also arms sales from the Netherlands are bigger than one would expect. The sale of armoured personnel carriers (a small kind of tanks) during the mid nineties is still one of the biggest sales in the history of Dutch arms.

In 1994 the Netherlands sold 599 YPR-765 and 12 M-577 tracked armoured vehicles. In 2005 a next sale of 431 YPR’s followed. The Dutch government defended this last sale by stating “that since 1994, as far as is known, Egypt used neither military equipment nor the armed forces against civilians.”

Follow-on deliverances continue as can be seen in information published by the Dutch government on arms sales. In a December 209 spreadsheet is a sale for armoured vehicle technology valued over one million euro’s (see table 2).

The deliverances are significant, not only because of their size, but also because of the potential use of this kind of weaponsystem during teh repression of popular protests. Small arms in the end do not convince really angry and desperate people. The bullets are taken as an inescapable part of the protests. That’s horrible, but the cruel reality. When armoured vehicles – in case of the Dutch ones also fitted with 25mm cannons – are deployed the military crew is invulnerable, but the protester defenceless and a easy prey.

In Cairo, until now luckily it is a different story with the army on neither side and waiting its chances. Before it was even seen on the side of the opposition: “(…) their displays of support for the protesters were conspicuous throughout the capital. In one striking example, four armoured military vehicles moved at the front of a crowd of thousands of protesters in a pitched battle against the Egyptian security police defending the Interior Ministry.”

The Netherlands sold more arms to Cairo like technology to produce night vision goggles. But the sale of the armoured vehicles remains the most important, although neglected by the press. If they will be or will not deployed against the masses protesting lies in the future. Let’s hope not.

Read more about Dutch arms export to Egypt? SURF HERE

AUTHOR: Martin Broek
URL: http://broekstukken.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: m.broek@xs4all.nl