“As an authoritarian regime, Burma was very close to an authoritarian China. As it democratizes, assuming that process continues, where do you see Burma’s international position going. Will it retain close ties with China? Will it draw closer to the United States? How do you see that evolving?”

“I should mention that when Burma became independent in 1948, we became independent as a parliamentary democracy, and we believed in the values of democracy, and although of course you can say we were not a perfect democracy, considering the fact that we had to cope with a lot of internal armed insurgences in those first years, we did well. We certainly felt free. I always remember the days of my childhood as days when people were not afraid to speak out against the government and of articles lampooning the Prime Minister appearing quite regularly in the past and nobody was arrested for that. So we were a practicing democracy, flawed, but still strong and going in the right direction. In those days we were one of the first countries to recognize a communist government of China in the 1950s and we established good relations with China, friendly relations. We maintained a neutral position. We were good friends of India, of China, of countries in our region and also of the western nations. We established good friendly relations with our ex-colonial government, the English. We became very friendly with them. We had good relations with the United States. And now that we are going back towards democracy I would like to think that Burma rather than being a bone of contention between China and the United States would be able to bring those two great countries together. It is in the interest of the world that the United States and China should be friends rather than adversaries. And this is something I would like to see. I would like to see a world where, the greater the powers are the more they realize that they have a responsibility to keep on good terms for the sake of the rest of the world. And I certainly would not like Burma to be in a position where we have to choose between one big power or the other. Or that we can not only be friends with both, but we may be an instrument of bringing them closer together. This may seem very ambitious but I think you have to be ambitious if you want to get somewhere.”

AUTHOR: Dr. Jason Abbott
URL: http://profjabbott.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: jason.abbott [at] louisville.edu

My interest in democratization came when, in the course of my continuing research in Southeast Asia, the region was hit by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. In the maelstrom that followed, mass demonstrations both forced the resignation of General Suharto after 31 years in Indonesia, and provoked a political stand-off in Malaysia between the country’s long-serving Prime Minister Mahathir and his former deputy Anwar Ibrahim. Watching events unfold, my work slowly moved away from questions of economic management to analyze and explain why reform succeeded in one country but not in another.

Fast forward eight years. I had moved to the School of Oriental and African Studies where Suu Kyi herself had been studying for a PhD when she returned to Burma during the student uprising in 1988 that would see her assume the mantle of democracy activist. Within the space of the 12 months I was at SOAS, Southeast Asia was catapulted into the global media spotlight first by the coup in Thailand and then by the uprising in Burma led by the country’s Buddhist monks. Both events brought with them numerous opportunities for comment both on the TV news as well as radio for which I was lucky to be in the proverbial right place at the right time. By now, though my own work was firmly focused on questions of democratic transition and while I continued to primarily specialize on Malaysia, the media work I had done on Thailand and Burma meant that I was more cognizant of the historical backgrounds of both those countries. I had also become personally inspired by Aung San Suu Kyi’s story having read her Letters from Burma and Freedom from Fear as well as several of the biographies that have been written.

Less than a year after moving to the SOAS, I saw a job listing in The Chronicle of Higher Education for the Aung San Suu Kyi Endowed Chair in Asian Democracy at the University of Louisville and decided to apply for the post. The rest as they say is history. I can honestly say that at no point in my own personal journey did I ever expect that one day I would have the opportunity to meet ‘The Lady’ (as she is affectionately known in Burma) nor that Burma would have begun the dramatic changes we have seen in the past year and a half. It is rare, as an academic that in the cloistered halls of university campuses, that you actually witness the events and get to meet directly the people about whom you derive causal explanations for change. That I will is both an honor and a privilege.

AUTHOR: Dr. Jason Abbott
URL: http://profjabbott.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: jason.abbott [at] louisville.edu

Derek Mitchell meeting Aung San Suu Kyi

I don’t know if he suspected that he’d be promoted back in January when he gave the Center for Asian Democracy’s inaugural annual lecture, but on May 17th Derek Mitchell, the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma, was nominated by President Obama to be the first US ambassador to the country in 22 years. The decision by the Obama administration to appoint a new ambassador comes as no surprise but it is more evidence of the dramatic changes that have taken place in Burma over the past 18 months. It also represents the latest in a series of measures by the US government to reward that progress and strengthen the hand of reformers in the Burmese government.

For Mitchell, assuming the nomination is accepted (which is likely given the bipartisan support for his nomination to the position of Special representative), the appointment will represent the culmination of a personal journey. Early in his career Mitchell expressed a profound interest and goal in helping to promote democratization in Burma. In 1996 he produced a testimonial video on Aung San Suu Kyi for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs when she was awarded the Harriman Democracy Award, and in 2007 co-authored an influential article in the journal Foreign Affairs with Michael Green that called for a new policy towards the country.

Mitchell’s appointment comes as European countries have agreed to a 12-month suspension of economic and financial sanctions on the country, and amidst increased pressure within the US to ease trade restrictions. It also comes on the eve of Suu Kyi’s first trip outside the country since she returned from England at the height of the protest movement for democracy in 1988. The Burmese opposition leader is due to collect the Nobel Peace Prize she was awarded in 1991 in a few weeks time and then travel to Switzerland and Britain where she will address the International Labor Organization and British parliament respectively.

AUTHOR: Dr. Jason Abbott
URL: http://profjabbott.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: jason.abbott [at] louisville.edu

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda

Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Japan

Re: Japan: Actively encourage the Burmese government to institute the systemic reforms necessary for Democracy

Dear Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda,

I am William Nicholas Gomes, Human Rights Ambassador for Salem News.com. I recognize the encouraging signs of change in Burma in the past year, including easing of official censorship, a new law on the right to strike, and amendments to electoral laws that permitted Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy to register and contest April by-elections, in which her party won almost all the seats it contested.

However, the overall human rights situation remains poor. Despite a series of releases of political prisoners, several hundred political prisoners remain incarcerated. Laws promulgated in recent months, including on peaceful assembly, fall short of international requirements. The newly created National Human Rights Commission also does not meet the standards of the Paris Principles on national human rights bodies, and the commission has yet to seriously investigate complaints of human rights abuses.

Burma is involved in the world’s longest running civil war, with the Burmese army engaged in armed conflicts with armed groups of various ethnic nationalities around the country. The government has embarked on ceasefire negotiations with a number of ethnic armed groups. However, army abuses against ethnic minorities continue and the armed forces have not changed their abusive behavior in ethnic conflict areas. For instance, fighting has been ongoing since June 2011 in Kachin State, with 75,000 people displaced as a result. The Burmese military continues to violate international humanitarian law through the use of extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, beatings, abusive forced labor, antipersonnel landmines, and pillaging of property. Kachin rebels have been implicated in the use of child soldiers and landmines.

Burma’s April by-elections brought opposition voices into parliament, which is an important step forward. However, the by-elections should not be used as a justification for unrestrained resumption of assistance and investment. Pursuing renewed foreign assistance and investment without regard for the human rights consequences and in the absence of a functioning legal framework, could derail Burma’s fragile gains of the past year.

Debt Relief and Yen Loans

I understand the Japanese government will soon announce the resumption of its yen loans for development assistance inside Burma. Before Japan restarts giving loans to Burma, it will need to decide what to do about the unpaid debt estimated at over 500 billion yen (US$6 billion) that the Burmese government owes Japan from loans from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. We understand there is ongoing discussion on how to address these arrears, including whether to cancel all or part of the debt and what should be the conditions to cancel any debt.

Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), including yen loans, is based on the 1991 “Four Principles of ODA” and the ODA Charter of 1992. Japan has pledged in its fourth principle, to pay full attention to democracy, basic human rights, and freedoms in its aid decisions. Restrictions by foreign governments, including Japan freezing its loans to Burma, have played a role in moving Burma to the hopeful point where it is today. While most of the pressure for change has come from within, the government now wants international legitimacy, and greater economic engagement with the outside world.

I call on the Japanese government to maintain sufficient leverage to be able to influence the much harder financial, economic planning, political, and social development issues that Burma needs to address. A staggered pay back of longstanding debt tied with partial alleviation would help ensure that human rights considerations are taken into account with respect to these issues, including promoting a more equitable distribution of resources than during the decades of corrupt military rule.

Regarding economic assistance, I recognize the desire of the Japanese government and people to assist Burma’s transition from authoritarian rule to a more open political and economic system.  Therefore any resumption of yen loans should be done in a way that supports economic development that benefits the Burmese people broadly, not contribute to corruption, cronyism, environmental degradation, and displacement. In short, Japanese assistance should help improve the human rights situation in Burma, not undermine reform efforts. It is also important to restart loans that would strengthen the hands of those acting to promote human rights and rule of law in the country, while putting at a disadvantage those holding progress back— including military leaders still engaged in human rights abuses in conflict areas and military-owned companies. Loans should be resumed step by step, over a period of several years, in response to significant and specific steps towards reform and greater respect for human rights by the Burmese government.

Prospective ODA projects in ethnic and borderland areas should be planned with particular care and transparency. Natural resource industries in these are monopolized by the military, managed in a way that fuels corruption, and have the effect of increasing the autonomy and impunity of the military vis-à-vis civilian officials. These sectors are also concentrated in areas of the country still beset by conflict, where the military continues to commit grave human rights abuses against the civilian population.

Restarting yen loan and any debt abolition should proceed in a manner that recognizes progress but preserves the leverage of the Japanese government and of Burma’s opposition and civil society, in the lead-up to the most important test of the government’s commitment to change, the 2015 elections.

Burmese government actions that could trigger positive responses include, for example:

• Releasing all remaining political prisoners;
• Instituting a credible process to review cases in which there is a disagreement about whether the person is imprisoned for political reasons;
• Allowing international and domestic humanitarian organizations, and independent human rights monitors unhindered access to conflict areas and the delivery of adequate amounts and kinds of humanitarian aid;
• Taking all necessary steps to end serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Burma’s conflict areas, investigate allegations of abuses, appropriately discipline and prosecute perpetrators, and promptly and adequately compensate victims of abuse;
• Reforming laws that criminalize free expression and that allow censorship of the media;
• Bringing Burmese law and practice into conformity with international standards on fundamental freedoms, including expression, association, and peaceful assembly;
• Amending constitutional provisions that empower the military over the civilian government and that prevent it from being accountable to civilian authority;
• Creating a climate conducive to free and fair elections in 2015; and affirming that the government is prepared to transfer power to whoever wins those elections;
• Fulfilling all of the recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry on Forced Labor in Burma;
• Establishing fiscal transparency in order to ensure the profits from natural resources benefit the people of Burma and are not squandered or stolen;

I do not advocate that the Japanese government or other actors develop or endorse a precise roadmap or matrix to restart yen loans, in which they promise specific rewards in exchange for specific steps such as those listed above. I recognize that significant actions by the Burmese government should trigger positive responses, but pre-arranged inducements could be counter-productive, including if the international community is forced to reward a step forward in one area while the Burmese government is stepping back in another. The international community should maintain the flexibility to respond appropriately if progress in one area in Burma is accompanied by setbacks in another. At every stage, it should consult with opposition leaders, civil society groups (including trade unions), and reformers in the government before moving forward.

Development that Emphasizes Respect for Human Rights

When conditions in Burma warrant the Japanese government moving to permit restarting yen loans, I encourage Japan to consider these important recommendations in its increase of aid programs.

The Japanese government should effectively engage with the Burmese people and civil society, and be transparent in developing proposals for working in Burma.

The Japanese government should actively and effectively engage with a broad range of civil society organizations in developing its proposals for working in Burma. In addition to civil society organizations in Rangoon and the capital, Naypyidaw, the Japanese government should engage with groups working in remote and conflict areas, and with those working on Burma from Thailand and other neighboring countries. Except for government officials, few residents in remote and conflict areas in Burma travel to Rangoon and Naypyidaw. People in these areas often face acute humanitarian needs, and receive little support from local officials. The Japanese government should ensure that the Burmese government grants assessment teams access to remote and conflict areas.

In the past, some activists have been imprisoned as a result of meeting or working with foreign officials, for instance in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. Japan should obtain assurances from the Burmese government that no one who engages with the Japanese government shall face reprisals. To ensure active engagement with the Burmese populace, the Japanese government should be transparent in developing its proposals for engagement, both inside Japan and Burma. The fact that Burma has been a closed country for so long makes it all the more necessary that the Japanese government is transparent, and is viewed to be as such.

The Japanese government should give priority to addressing urgent social needs and emphasize revenue and budget transparency together with anti-corruption measures with the Burmese government.

The Japanese government should make a priority of addressing urgent social needs, with a particular focus on health and education. As a component of its assessments and technical assistance, the Japanese government should emphasize revenue and budget transparency, and ensure that Burma’s own considerable resources are directed to poverty alleviation programs. For years the government of Burma’s revenues from natural gas sales have been largely hidden from the budget—and reportedly kept in overseas accounts—and not used to fulfill basic economic and social rights of the population. Plans to unify the country’s exchange rate system should help to correct some budgetary anomalies, but much work will be needed to ensure that all proceeds of natural resource extraction are fully on-budget. In addition, it will be necessary to trace and recover funds earned previously in order for those to be available to meet current and future needs.

Addressing corruption and unequal economic opportunities presents a particular challenge in Burma. The Japanese government should take special care to avoid further bolstering the economic elite who cultivated close ties to military authorities, and gained privileged access to state resources. The Japanese government should urge the Burmese government to dismantle the military’s vast network of businesses that it owns or controls, and to fundamentally reevaluate the military’s outsized share of the national budget.

In promoting better financial management, Japan should encourage the Burmese government to create independent oversight bodies, audit all government departments and government spending and make public these audits, make bidding and tendering for government procurement processes open and publish results, and make public contracts for natural resource extraction and sales.

The Japanese government should press the Burmese authorities to implement systemic reforms necessary for development.

I urge Japan to actively encourage the Burmese government to institute the systemic reforms necessary for open public debate, enabling citizens to hold the government accountable, as we believe that development assistance will not have the broad-based impact desired unless these reforms are undertaken. This includes repealing overbroad and vague laws used to repress the peaceful exercise of rights to expression, association and assembly.

Japan should emphasize in its meetings Burmese government ministries and agencies the importance of broad civil society engagement and its centrality to any programming. It should encourage the Burmese government to enhance access to information and subject decision-making processes to public discussion and input at all levels. Examples include community budgeting initiatives, public consultations about proposed legal reforms and the creation of independent oversight bodies.

There are severe labor rights problems in Burma, including abusive forced labor in combat zones. We urge the Japanese government to ensure that it does not directly or indirectly support such abuses. Japanese aid officials should regularly consult with the International Labor Organization (ILO) to ensure that any allegations of forced labor tied to Japanese aid projects be investigated under the Burmese government and ILO Supplementary Understanding of 2007, and that all aid projects pursue the target set by the ILO of eradicating all forced labor by 2015.

There are growing problems in Burma with land confiscation and inadequate compensation, particularly for farmers. Burma should enact new land laws that provide security of land tenure for people, particularly small-scale farmers, and meet international human rights standards. Currently farmers cannot use land as collateral since they do not have legal land titles, creating economic hardship and rendering them vulnerable to forced eviction. Two land reform bills have recently passed in parliament, the Farmland Bill and the Vacant, Fallow and Virgin Lands Management Bill. However, there has not been adequate consultation on the bills and there are concerns that the laws will not provide security of tenure or adequate appeal mechanisms. Too much authority appears to rest with farmland management bodies controlled by the state, including powers to order what can be cultivated on particular land. I urge the Japanese government to encourage the Burmese government to seek assistance from international experts in developing new land laws to ensure that they meet international human rights standards, and to consult broadly with agricultural and legal experts, farmers’ groups, and other affected elements of civil society. Land reform should be undertaken together with other legal reforms to ensure access to justice when rights are violated.

Thank you for your consideration of these important issues. I would be delighted to meet with you or your staff to discuss these issues in more detail.
Sincerely,

AUTHOR: William Nicholas Gomes
URL: www.williamgomes.org
E-MAIL: williamgomes.org [at] gmail.com

Senator The Honourable Bob Carr

Senator Bob Carr, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia

Re: Australia: Lead the Human Rights Movement in Asia

Dear Senator Bob Carr,

Congratulations on your recent appointment as Foreign Minister of Australia.

I am William Nicholas Gomes, Salem-News Human Rights Ambassador.  I look forward to working with you and the Gillard government to help Australia realize its commitments to protecting and promoting human rights.

Since 2007 the Australian government has expanded its human rights advocacy at the international level, including through its bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council. We welcome Australia’s commitment to engaging constructively in human rights dialogues and exchanges with individual countries, in particular within Australia’s region.

Australia is now well integrated as part of the Asia-Pacific region and, as you have mentioned, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries are important friends and trading partners for Australia.  On your recent trip to Cambodia, Singapore, and Vietnam you highlighted the importance of Southeast Asia to Australia’s foreign policy and identified the ASEAN bloc, taken as a whole, as Australia’s second largest trading partner.

I write to you to outline human rights concerns in several countries where we work and where I believe the right mix of pressure and engagement from Australia may make all the difference to protecting human rights. These countries include Burma, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.

Trade, as you acknowledged, is an important means by which to improve the living standards of people in the Asia-Pacific region. However, trade alone will not bring the necessary improvements to people in the region who are denied their basic freedoms.

Australia is uniquely a long-standing successful democracy in the Asian region, as well as the 13^th largest economy in the world. Australia’s close ties to countries in Southeast Asia create an opportunity for constructive dialogue on improving not just living standards of people in the region, but also their human rights.  Australia should leverage this position in the region and use every opportunity to raise human rights concerns, sensitively and constructively, as part of its bilateral and multilateral relations, as well as showing by example that it fully respects the human rights of all, including migrants and indigenous people in Australia.

Treaty Ratification and the Bali Process

I understand that through the Bali Process, Australia has tried to lift regional standards and cooperation to counter people-smuggling. However, we are concerned that punitive crackdowns on people-smuggling, without a corresponding regional framework in place to protect refugees and asylum seekers, could exacerbate the harm to people who are fleeing persecution. Currently, only two ASEAN member states, Cambodia and the Philippines, have ratified the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol. The absence of ratifications has serious consequences in terms of the protection of asylum seekers through regional cooperation frameworks, such as the Bali Process.

I recommend that Australia:

• Use its position in the region to encourage ASEAN member countries to ratify the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
• Exercise Australia’s leadership as co-chair of the Bali Process to ensure that the humane treatment of migrants, the ability of asylum seekers to access asylum processing systems and the principle of non-refoulement (non-return) are core objectives of the Bali Process, including any discussions or agreements on a regional offshore processing center for migrants.
• Make the Bali Process more transparent and accountable by ensuring that civil society groups are provided an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the process.
• Ensure that financial or technical assistance to other states for the purpose of strengthening border control and combating people-smuggling includes assistance and training in refugee law and refugee protection. Urge other states to ensure that any proposed people-smuggling legislation does not criminalize those acting with humanitarian, rather than financial, intentions, in accordance with international standards.

Burma

The Australian government has long taken a calibrated approach of targeted sanctions, principled engagement, and humanitarian aid to press for human rights and genuine democratic reform in Burma.

There have been encouraging signs of change in Burma in the past year, including easing of official censorship, a new law on the right to strike, and amendments to electoral laws that permitted the opposition National League for Democracy to register and contest April by-elections in which it won almost all the seats it contested.

However, the overall human rights situation remains poor. Despite the release of many political prisoners, several hundred political prisoners remain. Laws promulgated in recent months, including on the right to peaceful assembly, fall short of international standards. The newly created National Human Rights Commission also does not fulfill the Paris Principles on national human rights bodies, and the commission has not seriously investigated complaints of human rights abuses.

Now more than ever, countries like Australia should support democratic forces inside the country to push for real reform and the release of all political prisoners. I support your view that the peeling back of sanctions should only be done once further progress is made and recognized as authentic by the opposition. Blindly pursuing engagement for humanitarian assistance and foreign investment in the absence of a functioning legal framework could derail the fragile gains of the past year. Given the small number of seats involved, these by-elections were not a serious test of Burma’s commitment to democratic reform. The real test will be when people exert their basic rights, whether by acting under new laws or expressing views contrary to those of the military, which continues to be the controlling force in the country.

Burma has the world’s longest running civil war, with the Burmese army engaged in armed conflicts with armed groups of various ethnic minorities around the country. The government has embarked on ceasefire negotiations with a number of armed ethnic rebel groups. However, serious abuses by the army against ethnic minority populations continue.

For instance, fighting has been ongoing since June 2011 in Kachin State, with 75,000 people displaced as a result. The Burmese military continues to violate international humanitarian law through the use of extrajudicial killings, torture, sexual violence, abusive forced labor, antipersonnel landmines, and pillaging of property. The Kachin Independence Army has unlawfully used child soldiers and landmines.

I support Australia’s decision in January to remove some names from the list of individuals subject to targeted travel and financial sanctions. On April 6 you said, “We will continue to ease our sanctions in ways that acknowledge the progress made to date, while also encouraging further steps toward reform.” I fully share the view that it is important to ease sanctions, in a way that favors the forces of progress towards human rights and rule of law in the country, while continuing to disadvantage those holding progress back—which include military leaders implicated in human rights abuses in conflict areas and those with ties to with abusive military-owned companies. In light of this, Australia should now consider additional positive steps— for example, further easing of visa bans and asset freezes for select individuals, and the establishment of parliamentary exchanges.

I also support Australia’s significant increase in humanitarian aid to assist the Burmese people, up to Au$47.6 million in 2011-2012. As discussions begin on the return of an approximately 140,000 refugees from camps along the Thailand-Burma border, Australia should maintain support for those in refugee camps, ensure there is no premature push to refugees and that any repatriation will be voluntary, safe and dignified. To date, Australia has not supported efforts at cross-border assistance from Thailand to Burma to aid displaced communities in eastern Burma, but should reconsider that stance in light of Burmese government ceasefire talks with ethnic armed groups, and discussions on repatriating refugees and IDPs over the coming years.

I also appreciate Australia’s commitment to advocating greater assistance to Burma through international financial institutions and others but urge that such engagement take Burma’s challenging context into consideration.

I recommend that Australia:

• Support an independent international mechanism to investigate alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law committed by all parties to the conflicts in Burma, as well as to investigate and publicly report on the whereabouts and conditions of remaining political prisoners.
• Support the establishment of a United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights office in Burma with a standard protection, promotion, and technical assistance mandate.
• Continue to publicly press for the release of all remaining political prisoners in Burma.
• Potentially lift visa bans and asset freezes against named individuals in Burma that are not high-ranking military officials or their close associates, subject to a careful review to determine that they do not bear responsibility for abuses, while sanctions against key uniformed leaders of the armed forces should be maintained.
• Coordinate with other governments—particularly those that have sanctions in place on Burma—to develop new rules setting out core requirements for responsible, rights-respecting trade and investment in the country that will take effect as sanctions are selectively removed. In preparation, begin now to consult with civil society to develop strong accountability and transparency measures for businesses active in Burma.
• Maintain Australia’s arms embargo on Burma, as the government has pledged to do.
• Work with the government of Burma to institute sufficient legal, human rights, anti-corruption, and environmental safeguards to ensure that Burma’s governance reforms are sustainable in the long term.
• Similarly, design and pursue development efforts with due regard for the challenges of engagement in country that has been misruled for decades. Donor governments and institutions should consult with civil society and press Burma’s government to increase transparency and accountability, make urgent social needs a priority, and carry out systemic reforms necessary for meaningful development. Meaningful anti-corruption measures are needed so that Burma’s own considerable resources and outside assistance benefit the people of Burma and are not squandered or stolen.
• Increase assistance to IDPs and refugees and play a role in crucial human rights monitoring to ensure any eventual returns are voluntary, safe and dignified.
• Ensure that post-conflict development initiatives include a strong human rights protection component.

Cambodia

Australia has long been committed to Cambodia’s development. In 2011-2012 Cambodia will receive AU$77.4 million in Australian aid.

While we support Australia’s provision of aid to Cambodia, the donor relationship provides an important opportunity for Australia to assist Cambodia to overcome some of its serious human rights problems. In making your first state visit to Cambodia, you said, “It’s been a great honor for me to make my first visit as Australia’s Foreign Minister to Cambodia… Australia is a close and outstanding friend of Cambodia.”  While Australia clearly values its relationship with Cambodia, as a “friend” it should be prepared to speak more frankly about the serious human rights violations being committed against the Cambodian people in an environment of total impunity.

Freedom of expression, assembly and association remain under threat in Cambodia. The government is using criminal defamation and incitement laws to intimidate and imprison critics. Nongovernmental organizations have identified at least 12 persons imprisoned under these laws for peaceful expression of views since December 2010. The government also continues to systematically use a 2009 law to deny permission for public assemblies in Phnom Penh outside isolated “freedom parks.”

Arbitrary detention and torture are routinely used by the police and the military police to extract confessions, which are then used to obtain convictions. Cambodia’s prisons continue to be overcrowded and lack sufficient food, water, sanitation, and health care. Other facilities, such as the Prey Speu Social Affairs Center, are also used to arbitrarily detain people against their will, including homeless people, drug users, and sex workers rounded up from the streets. International Human Rights organization Human Rights Watch has found detainees there have been subjected to abuses including suspicious deaths, rape, torture, and beatings.

During your recent Phnom Penh visit, you recently announced an additional contribution of Au$1.61 million to fund the work of the Khmer Rouge trials, taking the total to more than Au$18 million donated by Australia since 2006. Australia is the second largest donor to the trials. After five years and more than AU$144 million, the court has prosecuted just one defendant, Kaing Guek Eav (alias Duch), while only three others are currently on trial.

In Phnom Penh, you stated that “the independence of the judiciary is paramount and the ECCC [Khmer Rouge tribunal] must be allowed to operate free from any external interference.” However, given recent events in Cambodia, a stronger statement supporting the importance of additional cases to proceed is warranted. Cases 003 and 004 are two cases comprising five suspects that were submitted by the international co-prosecutor to the Office of the Co-Investigating Judges in 2009. Two international co-investigating judges recently resigned, citing political interference from the Cambodian government. Prime Minister Hun Sen and the ruling Cambodian Peoples’ Party (CPP) have used their power over Cambodian appointed judges to systematically undermine the independence of the tribunal in pursuit of their demand that the tribunal only consider cases they would like to see prosecuted, flaunting the law and breaching the government agreement with the UN establishing the court.

Now more than ever, principled UN participation, asserting fair procedures and thorough investigations of all cases, is essential to ensuring that the Khmer Rouge tribunal is able to complete its mission to hold those “most responsible” for Khmer Rouge atrocities to account, as provided by law.

I recommend that Australia:

• Play a leadership role in pressing the United Nations to protect the integrity of the Khmer Rouge tribunal by nominating qualified international co-investigating and reserve co-investigating judges, and defending the legal authority and independence of the international co-investigating judge to investigate any cases of persons suspected of being most responsible for serious international crimes in Cambodia coming to their attention.
• Publicly call for the need for genuine, impartial, independent, and effective investigations into Khmer Rouge tribunal cases 003 and 004.
• Condemn the ongoing political interference by the Cambodian government, which undermines the judicial independence of the Khmer Rouge tribunal.
• Support the rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly by publicly calling for the release of all persons who are in prison for peacefully expressing their views and conducting peaceful protests.
• Demand the closure of the Prey Speu Social Affairs Center and other centers used to arbitrarily detain persons against their will.
• Urge improvements in conditions of detention in Cambodian prisons, in line with international standards.

Indonesia

Australia has significantly deepened its bilateral relationship with Indonesia in the past two years, elevating it to the status of a “comprehensive strategic partnership” in March 2010. Indonesia is now also the largest recipient of Australian aid funding, totaling A$558 million in 2011-2012. These factors create a unique opportunity for Australia to use its clout to seek better human rights outcomes in Indonesia.

Australia provides extensive support and training to Indonesian security forces. Impunity for members of Indonesia’s security forces remains a serious concern, with no civilian jurisdiction over soldiers who commit serious human rights abuses. Military tribunals are rarely held, lack transparency, and the charges frequently fail to reflect the seriousness of the abuses committed. Many of these abuses take place in Papua—however, access to Papua remains tightly controlled by the Indonesian government, and few foreign journalists or human rights researchers are able to visit without close monitoring of their activity.

For instance, in October 2012 Indonesian security forces used excessive force to break up a pro-independence demonstration in Jayapura, Papua. The security forces then used batons and in some instances firearms against the demonstrators, and as a result at least three people were killed and more than 90 others injured. As best I can determine, police and military officials involved have only received disciplinary infractions—no one has been charged with criminal offenses. To the contrary, the Jayapura police chief, Imam Setiawan, has subsequently been promoted.

Meanwhile, five of the activists who testified how security forces beat them during the crackdown have been tried and sentenced to three years in prison for makar (treason) because of pro-independence statements they made at the Congress. I believe that a clear and firm public statement on Australia’s position on respecting free expression and condemning impunity by security forces is critical, especially since there is a real risk that Australian Ambassador Greg Moriarty’s reference to the actions of Papuan People’s Congress leaders as “illegal, provocative, and counterproductive” may otherwise be interpreted as supporting further government crackdowns on the Congress.

The Lombok Treaty between Indonesia and Australia affirms the “sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity of both Parties” but it also requires respect for obligations under international law, including international human rights law.

Despite Indonesia’s progress as an emerging democracy, the country now has scores of political prisoners from Papua and the Moluccas, primarily individuals put behind bars for making statements or raising flags or displaying symbols that the Indonesian authorities interpreted as local calls for independence. Indonesian officials continue to enforce a number of laws that criminalize the peaceful expression of political, religious, and other views. These include offenses in Indonesia’s criminal code such as treason or rebellion (makar), “inciting hatred” (haatzai artikelen), and blasphemy.

Violence against religious minorities in Indonesia is on the rise. Islamist militants have mobilized mobs to attack religious minorities with impunity; short prison terms for a handful of offenders have done little to dissuade mob violence. The government has failed to revoke several decrees that discriminate against minority religions, fostering public intolerance.

I recommend that Australia:

• Urge Indonesia to lift all restrictions on access of foreign media and human rights organizations to Papua.
• Unequivocally condemn excessive use of force and the suppression of peaceful protests, and call on the Indonesian government to ensure that Indonesian security forces are properly held accountable for any alleged abuses. In particular, call for an investigation into alleged excessive use of force by the authorities at the Papuan Peace Congress last October.
• Call for Indonesia to amend or repeal laws that criminalize peaceful political expression and to free all prisoners held for peacefully expressing their political views.
• Condemn incidents of violence against religions in Indonesia, and call on the Indonesian government to repeal its decrees that discriminate against minority religions and ensure accountability for harm that is caused.

Malaysia

Malaysia is Australia’s third-largest trading partner in ASEAN. Despite Malaysian government promises of reform and relaxation of controls, the country in 2011 fell far short in meeting Prime Minister Najib Razak’s pledges to “uphold civil liberties” and build a “functional and inclusive democracy.”  Last year, the government arbitrarily detained outspoken critics, used tear gas and water cannon against thousands who peacefully marched in support of clean and fair elections, and replaced long-existing restrictions on free assembly with even more draconian controls.

A particular concern regarding the Australia-Malaysia relationship is the treatment of asylum seekers in Malaysia. Despite the High Court’s ruling that Malaysia does not have appropriate legal frameworks for protection of asylum seekers, there are currently two bills before the Australian Parliament seeking to revive the asylum swap deal.  Despite a reduction of forced repatriation at the Malaysia-Thai border, the Malaysian government still fails to protect asylum seekers and refugees. Malaysia has not ratified the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol and has no refugee law or procedure. Malaysian authorities still commit refoulement. In February 2012 they deported blogger Hamza Kashgari back to Saudi Arabia where he faces a possible death penalty for expression of his religious views. At no time were his lawyers or United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees representatives permitted access to him. Neither the Australian government’s bill (the Migration Legislation Amendment (Offshore Processing and other Measures) Bill 2011) nor the Hon. Rob Oakeshott MP’s bill (Migration Legislation Amendment (The Bali Process) Bill 2012) provide any legally binding Refugee Convention-related protection for persons removed from Australia under the proposed amendments. Each bill would send Australia’s asylum seekers to a precarious and uncertain future in Malaysia, and each raises serious concerns about Australia’s discharge of its obligations under the Refugee Convention.

I recommend that Australia:

• Stop pursuing any asylum swap arrangement with Malaysia given the absence in Malaysia of legal and practical protections required under the Refugee Convention.
• Raise concerns with Malaysia about its unwillingness to provide protection to asylum seekers and its attacks on free expression and assembly.

Vietnam

Australia’s bilateral relationship with Vietnam reached a significant milestone when the two countries signed the “Australia-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership” in September 2009. The provisions of the agreement were supplemented by a bilateral Plan of Action signed in October 2010. Australia’s development assistance for Vietnam in 2011-12 is budgeted at AU$137.9 million, which makes Vietnam the sixth largest recipient of Australian funding. Australia is also Vietnam’s fifth largest export market and among the top 10 trade partners. In addition, Vietnam and Australia are negotiating the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement. Next year, 2013, will mark the 40^th year since the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries. Australia should use its access and influence to urge Vietnam to improve its abysmal human rights record.

In Vietnam, many political detainees and prisoners have been charged under vaguely worded articles in Vietnam’s penal code that criminalize peaceful dissent. These crimes include “subversion of the people’s administration,” “undermining the unity policy,” “conducting propaganda against the state,” and “abusing democratic freedoms” to “infringe upon the interests of the State.”

Throughout 2011 and the first three months of 2012, there has been a steady stream of political trials and arrests in Vietnam. Bloggers, writers, human rights defenders, land rights activists, anti-corruption campaigners, and religious and democracy advocates faced harassment, intimidation, arbitrary arrest, torture, and imprisonment.

Police have prevented public celebration of religious events, intimidated and detained participants, and placed prominent leaders of these groups under house arrest. Even registered religious organizations such as the Redemptorist churches in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City were harassed repeatedly, including a mob attack against the Thai Ha Catholic church in Hanoi.

Vietnamese law authorizes arbitrary detention without trial. Peaceful dissidents and others deemed to threaten national security or public order may be involuntarily committed to mental institutions, placed under house arrest, or detained in state-run “rehabilitation” or “education” centers. Drug users can be held up to four years in government-run rehabilitation centers where they receive very little treatment but  are subjected  abuse including beatings, torture, forced labor (in the guise of so-called “labor therapy”), and solitary confinement. An assessment in early 2011 found that 123 drug detention centers across the country held 40,000 people, including children as young as 12.

Those held in drug detention centers reported being forced to work in cashew processing and other forms of agricultural production, and garment manufacturing and other forms of manufacturing, such as making bamboo and rattan products. Under Vietnamese law, companies that handle products from these centers are eligible for tax exemptions. Some products produced as a result of this forced labor made their way into the supply chain of companies that sell goods abroad, including to Australia.

During your March 27-29 visit to Vietnam, you stated that Australia considers Vietnam as one of its key partners in the Asia-Pacific and that the Australian government will continue to give “priority to Vietnam in official development assistance. I urge that Vietnam’s concrete human rights improvement be an integral part of Australia’s official engagement in Vietnam.

I recommend that Australia:

• Call on Vietnam to immediately release all political and religious prisoners and urge Vietnam to amend or repeal provisions that criminalize peaceful dissent and certain religious activities on the basis of imprecisely defined “national security” crimes to bring Vietnam’s laws and regulations into full compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Vietnam has ratified.
• Urge Vietnam to repeal Ordinance 44, which authorizes administrative detention, house arrest, and detention in Social Protection Centers and psychiatric facilities for two-year renewable periods, without trial, for individuals deemed to have violated national security laws.
• Urge Vietnam to recognize independent labor unions and to ratify and implement International Labor Organization Conventions No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize), No. 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining) and No. 105 (Abolition of Forced Labor).
• Ensure that no funding, programming, and activities directed to assisting Vietnam’s drug detention centers are supporting policies or programs that violate international human rights law, including prohibitions on arbitrary detention, forced labor, torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Vetting procedure for security force cooperation

A common issue in many countries where Human Rights Watch works is a lack of accountability for crimes committed by security forces, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture. I believe impunity will be addressed only by raising the stakes for committing such crimes, which requires concerted international pressure for abusive personnel to be brought to justice. Knowing that Australia plays a vital role in training security forces and helping to promote human rights in many of these countries, we also call on your administration to establish and make publicly available a procedure by which appropriate Australian officials will systematically vet the human rights records of security forces that Australia seeks to train.

This procedure should:

• Conduct vetting at the individual, unit, and force levels.
• Require that countries provide complete deployment histories of the individuals and units that Australia seeks to train.
• Consult with civil society groups about the human rights performance of individuals, units, and forces that Australia seeks to train before agreeing to provide such training.
• Require that countries provide information about police investigations and military tribunal proceedings involving members of the security forces affiliated with the units that Australia seeks to train.
• State the consequences that will result if the vetting procedure outlined above reveals that members or units of the security forces that Australia seeks to train have been credibly accused of past human rights violations and have not been effectively investigated and prosecuted by local authorities.
• Make this protocol publicly available, and it in turn should provide that until credible investigations and appropriate prosecutions are conducted and the results made public, the individual or unit implicated will be ineligible for Australian support.

I urge you, as Foreign Minister, to sponsor an initiative to develop such a protocol. Thiscould be developed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, or as a joint initiative with the Ministry of Defense.

I look forward to discussing these matters with you further.`

AUTHOR: William Nicholas Gomes
URL: www.williamgomes.org
E-MAIL: williamgomes.org [at] gmail.com

Exact details of what is taking place within the upper echelons of Burma’s military and political elite are hard to determine given the nature of the regime and its decades of isolation from the international community. However, several recent reports, including one in the influential periodical The Economist, pointed to deep divisions between those advocating reform and hardliners. The surprising gambit to allow Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy to contest recent by-elections seems to have been made by convincing a third group, call them the fence-sitters, that such a move would be rewarded by the West lifting some crucial economic sanctions. There is a real danger however that the gambit may backfire. The sheer scale of the victory for the NLD and Suu Kyi while not immediately threatening the hold on power the military enjoys nevertheless suggests that they would be swept from power if the reform program culminated in free elections in 2015. Consequently Suu Kyi’s victory may have significantly undermined the position of President Thein Sein. In this light the West needs to reward the incredible progress that has been made in Burma in the past 18 months by offering enough prizes to shore up the reformers. Indeed Cameron himself alluded to this in his press conference stating,

“I met with President Thien Sein today and there are prospects for change in Burma and I think it is right for the rest of the world to respond to those changes… Of course we must respond with care, we must always be skeptical and questioning because we want to know those changes are irreversible, but as we have discussed, I think it is right to suspend the sanctions that there are against Burma…I do think it is important to send a signal that we want to help see the changes that can bring the growth of freedom of human rights and democracy in your country.”

The goal of both the Cameron and Obama administrations should be to work to bring together reformers and softliners in the government with moderates in the opposition to encourage a gradual negotiated transition to democracy. Such a task will be fraught with challenges, compromises, difficulties and problems but the only realistic alternative to it is yet another brutal crackdown the people of Burma cannot afford.

AUTHOR: Dr. Jason Abbott
URL: http://profjabbott.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: jason.abbott [at] louisville.edu

Baroness Catherine Ashton

Baroness Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union

Dear High Representative,

I write to you regarding recent developments in Burma and the forthcoming EU foreign ministers debate on reviewing the Common Position on Burma on April 23.

The EU has made positive gestures to support the nascent reforms in Burma, including pledging of €150 million for humanitarian assistance, and high-level visits by a number of EU foreign ministers. At this critical juncture, the EU will need to decide which sanctions should be suspended, such as visa bans on select individuals and restrictions on development assistance, while others should for now be maintained, including sanctions on sectors where the military maintains control, such as on gems, timber, and named enterprises.

The results of April 1 by-elections in Burma show just how much the Burmese people want reform and respect for human rights, and the depth of their support for democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD). It is a very positive step that they have been given the right to express their aspirations in this way, a step that should be recognized by the European Union.

While the NLD’s victory at the by-elections will make it harder for reactionary forces in Burma to pull the country backwards, they do not guarantee that Burma will move forward. The political opposition may have a monopoly on legitimacy in Burma, but the military still has something close to a monopoly on power – it runs the key ministries, does not answer to parliament or the courts, and can veto constitutional changes. The constitution still gives the military the right to appoint 25 percent of the seats in parliament. The commander in chief of the army continues to have the constitutional right to appoint and dismiss the president. The military continues to monopolize vast sectors of Burma’s economy and controls resources Burma earns from exporting natural resources. Even if reformers in the government are serious about tackling these problems, it will take time for them to do so and overcome potential resistance from the military itself.

The government still hasn’t made most of the legal, political and economic reforms necessary for Burma to move from dictatorship to democracy – reforms that may threaten some of the military’s core interests. Everything that has been granted in recent months, largely thanks to the good will of the president, can be taken away. It’s not clear that the military will eventually allow a real transfer of power to a government led by those elected by the free will of the people. The elections that really count are in 2015.

Sanctions have played a role in getting Burma to the hopeful point that it is today. While most of the pressure for change has come from within, the government now wants international legitimacy and greater economic engagement with the West. In this critical period, sanctions have given the democratic opposition negotiating leverage with the government, allowing it to bargain for entry into parliament, and the start of a reform process, as a condition for asking that sanctions be eased. It is essential to send some positive signals to the leadership now that they have taken initial steps. But the EU and the domestic opposition will need to maintain some leverage to influence the much harder decisions to come.

It is also important to ease sanctions, in a way that favors the forces of progress towards human rights and rule of law in the country, while continuing to disadvantage those holding progress back – including military leaders still engaged in human rights abuses in conflict areas and military owned companies.

In light of this, the EU should now consider several positive steps – for example, further easing of visa bans, and increases in humanitarian and development assistance. Visa bans and asset freezes against named individuals in Burma that are not high-ranking military officials or their close associates could potentially be lifted, subject to a careful review to determine that they do not bear responsibility for abuses, while sanctions against key uniformed leaders of the armed forces should be maintained.

The EU should also maintain restrictive measures against sectors of the economy like gems, timber and mining. These and other natural resource industries are monopolized by the military, managed in a way that fuels corruption, and have the effect of increasing the autonomy and impunity of the military vis-à-vis civilian officials. These sectors are also concentrated in areas of the country still beset by conflict, where the military continues to commit grave human rights abuses against the civilian population.

Lifting sanctions on gems and timber, for example, would not advance reform in Burma – to the contrary, it could reinforce economic practices that empower reactionary forces and diminish incentives for reform. It would also be a breach of faith with the ethnic minority communities, given that Burmese army abuses against ethnic minorities continue with impunity, and these minorities have little say in how the government pursues development in their parts of the country. For instance, fighting has been ongoing since June 2011 in Kachin State, with 75,000 people displaced as a result. Human Rights Watch has reported, “‘Untold Miseries:’ Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State,” that documents has noted serious abuses by the Burmese army against ethnic Kachin civilians, including forced labor, targeting of civilians, torture, and ill-treatment. I urge that the EU’s arms embargo against Burma should not be subject to review or removal, in light of ongoing abuses in conflict areas, will human rights and humanitarian law violations continue with impunity.

Sanctions should be lifted step by step, over a period of perhaps three years, in response to significant and specific steps towards reform and greater respect for human rights by the Burmese government. The easing or suspension of sanctions should proceed in a manner that recognizes progress but preserves the leverage of the EU and of Burma’s opposition and civil society, in the lead-up to the most important test of the government’s commitment to change, the 2015 elections.

Burmese government actions that could trigger positive responses include, for example:

Releasing all remaining political prisoners;
Instituting a credible process to review cases in which there is a disagreement about whether the person is imprisoned for political reasons;
Allowing international and local humanitarian organizations and independent human rights monitors unhindered access to conflict areas and the delivery of adequate amounts and kinds of humanitarian aid;
Invoking a zero tolerance of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations in Burma’s conflict areas, investigate allegations of crimes, discipline and prosecute perpetrators and compensate victims;
Reforming laws that criminalize free expression and allow censorship of the media;
Bringing Burmese law and practice into conformity with international standards on fundamental freedoms, including expression, association, and assembly;
Altering constitutional provisions that give the military powers over the civilian government and that prevent it from being accountable to civilian control;
Creating a climate conducive to free and fair elections in 2015; and affirming that the government is prepared to transfer power to whoever wins those elections;
Fulfilling all of the recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry on Forced Labor in Burma.
I do not advocate that the EU or other actors develop or endorse a precise roadmap or matrix to ease or lift sanctions, in which they promise specific rewards in exchange for specific steps such as those listed above. I recognize that significant actions by the Burmese government should trigger positive responses but pre-arranged inducements could be counter-productive, including if the international community is forced to reward a step forward in one area while the Burmese government is stepping back in another. The international community should maintain the flexibility to respond appropriately if progress in one area in Burma is accompanied by setbacks in another. At every stage, it should consult with opposition leaders, civil society groups (including trade unions), and reformers in the government before moving forward.

When conditions in Burma warrant the EU moving to permit investment and trade in mining, timber and gem sectors and with the Burmese partners that are subject to sanctions, new rules should be put in place setting out core requirements for responsible, rights-respecting trade and investment in Burma. In preparation for that time, the EU should begin now to consult with civil society to develop strong accountability and transparency measures for businesses active in Burma.

AUTHOR: William Nicholas Gomes
URL: www.williamgomes.org
E-MAIL: williamgomes.org [at] gmail.com

Courtesy of The Irrawaddy

Late last night (Tuesday April 3^rd) Burma’s State Television officially announced that Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy had won 43 of the 44 parliamentary seats it contested in by-elections on Sunday. The ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (the party led by former members of the Junta) won one, and then in a seat where the NLD candidate had been disqualified. Few if any expected the NLD to carry nearly all before them, fewer still expected that the elections would not be marred in part by some attempts to ‘massage’ the figures. The result generated a whole host of epithets, ‘historic’, ‘landmark’, ‘watershed’, ‘groundbreaking’ as well as scenes of wild jubilation on the streets of the former capital and commercial center of the country Rangoon (Yangon). Equally some among the pro-democracy advocacy groups sought to prick the bubble of rising expectations by both soberly reflecting on the dominance of the military-backed USDP in a relatively powerless parliament and pointing to continued human rights abuses against the country’s ethnic minorities even as millions celebrated Suu Kyi’s victory.

AUTHOR: Dr. Jason Abbott
URL: http://profjabbott.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: jason.abbott [at] louisville.edu

In practical terms today’s elections will have a very limited effect for two main reasons. Firstly the Burmese parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) has relatively little power under the 2008 constitution while secondly the 45 seats that were contested in today’s by-elections constitute only about ten percent of the parliament’s total size.  So the significance of today’s elections is principally symbolic, both internally and externally.

Domestically this represents the first time since 1990 that both Aung San Suu Kyi and her party have taken part in elections in the country. Although the NLD won a landslide in those elections, the military declared them null and void and so as a consequence Suu Kyi’s widely anticipated victory in today’s poll will see her hold political office for the very first time. In addition she is likely to also assume the mantle of the official leader of the opposition in parliament from where she is expected to lead a push to revise the current constitution to reduce the role of the military in political life. In particular Suu Kyi will push for the removal of the 110 seats reserved for the military in the lower chamber of the parliament and 56 in the upper chamber.

Externally these  elections represent a benchmark against which the international community will measure the progress of the reform process begun under Prime Minister Thein Sein in November 2010.  Although there have been reports of some electoral irregularities, if the international community finds that the elections have been mostly free and fair it is widely anticipated that both the European Union and the United States are likely to remove some of the economic and financial sanctions in place both to reward the reformers as well as to encourage further political liberalization. Today’s elections then do represent a crucial watershed in the process of political reform and rehabilitation, they may even prove to be historic.

AUTHOR: Dr. Jason Abbott
URL: http://profjabbott.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: jason.abbott [at] louisville.edu

AUTHOR: Dr. Jason Abbott
URL: http://profjabbott.blogspot.com
E-MAIL: jason.abbott [at] louisville.edu